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A big problem with water markets is the 
indefiniteness of the transferable right due to 
“third party” impacts. Buyers and sellers 
cannot be certain about what can be transferred 
before transfer arrangements are researched 
hydrologically, ecologically, socially, and 
economically. This means that transaction 
costs are high in many transfer situations, 
particularly where water is transferred or 
diversion points are relocated. If the rhetoric of 
market proponents regarding the social welfare 
necessity of fully pricing or valuing all impacts 
of such transfers is to be taken seriously, 
transaction costs should be high. 
 
Despite exhortations to treat water as 
simply another resource commodity like coal 
or oil, the “water is different” theme persists. It 
persists because it is historically validated The 
hydrologic cycle plays a major biogeochemical 
role. Water is a controlling influence on 
climate and weather; it is a critical factor in 
soil formation and erosion; it is the major 
transport medium for many other elements; it 
is perhaps the most important physical aspect 
of the ecosystem. In both marine and terrestrial 
environments, the quality of water and its rate 
of movement determine the primary 
characteristics of the ecosystem. Water is 
different also because it is a means of 
production which can only be limitedly 
substituted for in irrigated agriculture. To sell 
this means of production thus entails the 
discontinuation of farming (reversion to 
dryland is often not physically, economically, 
or culturally possible). As Nunn and Ingram 
(1988) have argued, the loss of farms through 
agricultural-to-urban transfers may have 
significant social impacts that remain largely 
uncaptured by market transactions. 
If we have learned anything from the 
efforts over the past twenty years to get us to 
pay attention to environmental and social 
impacts of economic growth, we should be 
arguing for greater articulation of the 
ecological, social, and long-term economic 
effects of market transfers of water. As things 
stand at present, we have made only marginal 
progress toward protecting extra-market 
values in the economic development process. 
This failure results largely from the tyranny of 
non-decision-making and what Odum (1982) 
aptly called the “tyranny of small decisions.” 
 
Non-decisions About Growth and Water 
Supply 
 
Water supply does not develop in 
isolation from economic growth and the 
exercise of power. Growth generates the 
demand and power supplies the political 
ability to secure water through government or 
private action (Walker and Williams 1982). 
The literature on industrial location and 
regional development is divided on the 
importance of water, but in general, water is 
not a major cost item for industries. What is at 
issue is water sufficiency for the residential 
and commercial developments that serve 
industries (broadly defined). Housing 
developers obviously have a great interest in 
securing water service. But though it is a basic 
requirement for development, water is not 
necessarily a determinant of development. In 
other words, its initial presence or absence 
does not mean much because water is such a 
relatively minor cost in urban development; it 
is unthinkable that lack of supply should stand 
in the way of the immense profits to be made 
in manufacturing, commerce, or residential 
development (Walker and Williams 1982). For 
this reason, water supply is not left to chance. 
Political power is exercised to see that 
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water resources are developed in anticipation 
of or to meet existing demand. 
 
These days, the water supplies of many 
major metropolitan areas in both arid and 
humid parts of the United States, need 
augmenting because of population growth, 
economic growth, water quality deterioration, 
and so forth. Large-scale, long-distance 
transfers have become too unpopular and 
expensive, and the most easily developed 
supplies were long ago dammed and diverted. 
As a result, sustained economic development 
has required periodic, if not continual, demand 
management in many places (i.e., Arizona, 
California, New York, and Massachusetts), and 
many small-scale rural-urban transfers. 
Clearly, the relationship of urban growth and 
water supply development is becoming more 
important. 
 
What does non-decision-making have to 
do with this? Non-decision-making is a process 
by which the political agenda is controlled 
(perhaps not even intentionally) by “confining 
the scope of decision making to relatively 
‘safe’ issues” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 
378). Given the embeddedness of water supply 
development within the regional economic 
development matrix, one would think that the 
water-growth issue would be on the political 
agenda. In our experience in Arizona and 
Massachusetts water management, however, 
that relationship is never ever overtly 
examined in a public forum - at least not 
seriously, and not for very long. For example, 
when a recent groundwater supply 
management strategy was circulated for 
comment in Arizona, a Sierra Club 
representative wrote comments asking the state 
agency to examine the water management -
growth control issue. The state bureaucrat 
chiefly responsible for the plan took these 
comments to be too “negative” to be taken 
seriously. The growth control - water supply 
relationship is on the minds of many and 
certainly implicit (if not explicit) within some 
state’s legislation, however, within the 
government agencies managing water, it is 
verboten to mention it. Thus, no real analysis 
is done to determine what the explicit tradeoffs 
should be between development and protection 
of environmental and social values not favored 
by new urban growth. 
 
Decisions about allowable impacts of 
transfers on ecological systems, instream 
flows, or other parties may increase (and 
possible decrease) the amount of water 
available for new development.1 These are 
small decisions, often never reviewed 
seriously by the public or even by the people 
making them within state and local agencies. 
Yet they may potentially add up to significant 
losses in terms of riparian vegetation, 
wetlands, and other attributes of place that are 
environmentally and socially important. Thus, 
non-decision-making means that the hidden 
conflicts between economic growth, profits, 
and extra-market values are addressed only 
within the arena of these seemingly 
insignificant, but cumulatively important, 
small decisions. 
 
The Role of Nomnarket Institutions in 
Protecting Extra-market Interests 
 
A partial explanation for the failure of 
water agencies and others to address the 
deeper conflict in water supply development 
and transfer is the entrenchment of the 
ideology of growth in water legislation and 
agency tradition. Water allocation policies in 
the United States have been geared to promote 
growth at least since the nineteenth century 
(Horwitz 1977). During the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, American legal 
conceptions of property in land and water 
resources began to change from the static, 
exclusionary posture of English common law 
to a more dynamic and instrumental 
orientation compatible with fostering 
economic expansion. During the early stage of 
expansion, capital and labor were relatively 
scarce. The Appropriation Doctrine promoted 
the security of investment 
1Demand management decisions fall into this category as well. 
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necessary for development under such conditions. 
As capital became more abundant and pressure on 
water resources increased, the hue and cry rose up 
for permission of more injury or greater risk (less 
protection) and less “waste” in order to sustain 
economic development. 
 
A growth ideology pervades the dialogue 
among persons and agencies involved in water 
supply and management. Public and private water 
suppliers are dedicated to serving all customers 
and the necessity of meeting “water needs” 
whatever and wherever they may be. There has 
been no shortage of local enthusiasts pushing 
various water schemes. The overall unity of 
purpose even across rural-urban lines has been 
remarkable (Walker and Williams 1982; Nunn 
and Ingram 1988). Even demand management 
schemes implemented to control “waste” of water 
also reflect a growth promotion orientation, 
particularly when new development is not 
precluded. 
 
There are a number of reasons why the pro-
development (low water-at-any-cost) posture has 
not been more seriously challenged. Theorists of 
non-decision-making suggest three explanations 
for the passivity of the groups which are the 
“victims” of this type of political control 
(Blowers 1984). First, an issue may not be 
challenged because it is anticipated that nothing 
will come of the challenge or the consequences of 
action may be undesirable. Second, whether due 
to apathy, pessimism, lack of resources to expend 
on challenge, or other reasons, groups may simply 
not wish to become involved - they may wish to 
spend their time, money, and personal resources 
doing other things. Third, people may not 
challenge because they are not mobilized to do so. 
As Nunn and Ingram (1988, 477) point out, “the 
widely shared, diffused impacts which leave no 
identifiable group perceivably better or worse off 
than any other group are far less likely to generate 
activity.” Also, people may be simply unaware of 
their interests in the outcome. Wetlands, riparian 
vegetation, rural community stability, and other 
similar kinds of concerns have not been as 
successfully promoted for as long a time as have 
ideas such as “waste not, want not,” “your job 
depends on growth,” or “growth is good for 
everyone.” The call to reduce resource “waste” is 
used to justify all sorts of actions that benefit 
relatively few rather richly. For example, it is just 
short of criminal to leave water resources that 
could benefit urban development interests in the 
hands of nefarious irrigators. Howe et al. (1986, 
439) state that “[it] is ludicrous that Southern 
California should incur a cost in excess of $450 
per acre-foot for additional water while irrigators 
in the Central Valley continue to irrigate 
thousands of acres of crops which are in surplus 
nationally.” Ludicrous for whom and under what 
criteria? The public (most of whom gain very 
little personally from supply or demand 
management) is lulled by this combination of 
anti-waste and pro-growth ideology into believing 
that water development and transfer is a 
compelling need that must be satisfied with haste. 
 
Thus, the agency responsible for protecting 
third party impacts is operating under an explicit 
or implicit water-for-growth mandate. The 
political pressure on state water management 
agencies who oversee water rights transfers is 
heavily weighted in favor of those who stand to 
directly gain from such transfers. Social and 
environmental values are not actually part of the 
larger decision agenda. Rather, they are addressed 
in the small decisions that are made within the 
agency. The manner in which social and 
environmental interests lose out in the small 
decisions made by agencies is discussed using an 
example from Massachusetts.2 
 
Contradictions and Small Decisions 
 
Massachusetts has a new water 
management act which became effective in March 
1986 
 
2This is in no way intended as a criticism of Massachusetts DEQE. They have handled the public input into water management 
remarkably well given the resource constraints under which they operate. 
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(see MGL Chapter 21G). It authorizes the 
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering 
(DEQE) to regulate the quantity of water 
withdrawn from surface and groundwater, and to 
ensure adequate water supplies for current and 
future water needs. The Water Management Act 
mandates the water resources commission to adopt 
principles, policies and guidelines designed to 
“protect the natural environment of the water in the 
commonwealth; to assure comprehensive and 
systematic planning and management of water 
withdrawals and use in the commonwealth, 
recognizing that water is both finite and renewable; 
and to allow continued and sustainable economic 
growth throughout the commonwealth and increase 
the social and economic well being and safety of 
the commonwealth’s citizens and of its work 
force.” Once all existing users register their uses in 
subbasin, the DEQE will have some idea as to how 
much water remains for permitting of new uses. If 
no water above what is defined as “safe yield” is 
available, water right transfers are expected to 
occur. 
 
In adopting regulations establishing criteria 
and standards for obtaining permits (and for 
approving transfers), the Act requires the 
department to assure that the following factors be 
considered: 
 
(1) the impact of the proposed withdrawal on 
other water sources which are hydrologically 
interconnected with the water source from which 
the withdrawal is to be made; 
 
(2) the anticipated times of year when 
withdrawals will be made; 
 
(3) the water available within the safe yield of 
the water source from which the withdrawal is to 
be made; 
 
(4) reasonable protection of water uses, land 
values, investments and enterprises that are 
dependent on previously allowable withdrawals; 
 
(5) the use to be made of the water proposed to 
be withdrawn and other existing, presently from 
which the withdrawal is to be made; 
 
 
(6) any water resources management 
plan for 
any city or town in which the affected water 
source is located; 
 
(7) any state water resources management plan 
adopted by the commission; 
 
(8) reasonable conservation practices and 
measures, consistent with efficient, utilization of 
the water; 
 
(9) reasonable protection of public drinking 
water supplies, water quality, wastewater 
treatment capacity, waste assimilation capacity, 
groundwater recharge areas, navigation, 
hydropower resources, water-based recreation, 
wetland habitat, fish and wildlife, agriculture, and 
flood plains; and 
 
(10) reasonable economic development and the 
creation of jobs in the commonwealth. 
 
This is quite a large order for state agency 
personnel to fill. To actually do the kind of 
weighing that the Act seems to require would take 
enormous resources in terms of time, talent, data, 
methodology, and knowledge. Of course, the 
actual implementation process is quite different 
than one might envision from reading the statute. 
Five people are assigned to the implementation of 
the Water Management Act within the DEQE at 
present. One person is in charge of surface water, 
another is in charge of groundwater, two are 
working largely on conservation issues, and the 
fifth person is wearing several hats including 
supervisor and political interference runner. 
 
The tyranny of small decisions becomes 
apparent when we examine a simple case of 
wetland protection (see [9] above) and 
groundwater withdrawal (either from right transfer 
or for new development). The regulations are not 
finalized for permit evaluation at the time of 
writing, but a possibility is that permit applicants 
may have to submit pump test data if the point of 
development is within 1,000 feet of a wetland or 
an existing registered user. At this time, the 
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person doing the application review happens to 
be a hydrogeo!ogist. As such, we will know very 
well how to interpret pump test data. 
Nevertheless, there is an art to such 
interpretation because many factors influence 
cone of depression expansion during pumping. If 
the pump test is run during a “wet” season or 
year, the drawdown may not reflect what 
happens during dry periods. If the pump test is 
run during the winter, it may not reflect the 
greater seasonal use of other pumpers in the 
warmer months. Unlike very large alluvial 
systems, fractured rock and surficial geologic 
media do not necessarily exhibit uniform 
behavior that can be expected to continue into 
the future. Then there are the small decisions that 
have to do with the 1,000 feet guideline and with 
the “safe yield” criteria. Why 1,000 feet? There 
may be many instances where impacts can be 
measured outside of that circumference. Safe 
yield will be defined most likely by selecting a 
probability of flow from streamfiow histograms. 
Although an advisory committee and others will 
make recommendations regarding these 
decisions, the agency will be largely responsible 
for the final determinations. These final 
determinations will reflect the personal biases 
and experience of agency personnel, and the 
resource constraints of the agency in general. 
 
Now, given that our permit application 
reviewer is a hydrogeologist and not a wetlands 
expert, how can we be certain that there is 
reasonable protection offered such habitat and 
the fish and wildlife dependent upon it? The 
relationships between groundwater, surface 
water, and wetlands are not very widely known 
or researched, and in at least three of the most 
popular introductory hydrogeology texts there is 
no mention of wetlands. The first small decision 
that the evaluator wants to make is to require that 
an applicant for permit only concern herself-
himself with wetlands that are mapped. We do 
not have much experience with wetlands 
mapping but we suspect there are many in 
Massachusetts that are not formally mapped. 
Unless some private citizen or public group is 
particularly vigilant, then, the unmapped 
wetlands will not receive any protection from 
the state. Second, the department will have to 
determine what the criteria are for reasonable 
protection of a wetland. Does this mean one foot 
of decline over a specific period of time given 
the special conditions under which the pump test 
data were collected?3 Will it mean no water level 
decline? Will it mean lowering only during 
dryer• years? This is a serious problem because 
the lowering of the groundwater level would 
radically change the nature of any wetland. 
 
Wetlands can be divided into four main 
categories: bogs, fens, swamps, and marshes. 
Bogs and fens are peatlands. Their soil consists 
of partially decomposed or undecomposed 
organic matter, particularly sphagnum moss. 
Fens occur at or around groundwater discharge 
sites or downslope of discharge sites - anywhere 
that slow moving water is trapped and held 
before escaping through a small outlet. Fens, 
because they are more nutrient rich and less 
acidic, contain highly diverse plants, including, 
sphagnum moss and other plants found in bogs 
as well as unusual orchids and other plants. The 
vegetation in a bog is isolated from surface and 
groundwater receiving its moisture only through 
precipitation. A fen may develop into a bog 
when the living and dead organic matter 
accumulates to such a degree that the living 
vegetation is isolated from ground and surface 
water. Bogs also occur in basins, such as kettle 
holes, where there is no outlet. The vegetation of 
a bog consists of a floating mat of leather leaf, 
sphagnum moss and other plants that are able to 
survive the highly acidic, nutrient poor 
environment. Eventually the organic matter fills 
the basin and conifers capable of colonizing 
acidic, nutrient poor soils invade and the bog 
becomes forest. Bogs contain a unique biota, 
including the famous carnivorous plants. 
 
3The agency is currently seeking information from the state wetlands division to aid in criteria design. 
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Swamps and marshes have more water 
movement. Their soils are partially or 
completely decomposed organic matter mixed 
with mineral soils. The vegetation of a marsh is 
grasses and floating leaved plants. Swamps 
contain trees and shrubs. A marsh contains 
standing water. The soil of a swamp is always 
saturated and may contain pockets of standing 
water. The biota of swamps and marshes is much 
more diverse than that of bogs and fens. Marshes 
and swamps are nurseries for fish and breeding 
and feeding grounds for waterfowl and other 
birds. They are inhabited by small mammals 
such as mice and voles and utilized by large 
mammals such as moose and deer. Some are 
created and utilized by beaver. There are few 
ecosystems that contain as diverse an array of 
life or are utilized at some point in the life cycle 
of so many animals as swamps and marshes. 
Lowering the groundwater level could isolate 
fen vegetation from groundwater, thus leading to 
reduction in species diversity and the 
development of a bog. It may have the same 
effect on a bog as the filling in of the basin with 
organic matter leading to the loss of the unique 
bog biota and the development of forest. 
Lowering of the groundwater level could cause a 
marsh to shift to a swamp and a swamp to shift 
to forest. 
 
Even if every effort is made to understand 
and protect these complex ecosystems, 
administrative criteria are by nature under- and 
over-inclusive. While 1,000 feet may not be 
inclusive enough, 2,800 feet may be over-
inclusive. It may be that we shouldn’t be looking 
at feet from a conflicting use at all. Perhaps we 
should be looking at microbes and hydrogenase 
production in relation to wetlands preservation 
(Deevey 1970). The point is that all of these 
small decisions can add up to large effects in the 




The whole idea of moving water from one 
place to another or moving a diversion point 
from one place to another for the purpose of 
economic development is troublesome because it 
means further disruption of ecological and social 
patterns that are generally not accounted for 
adequately. Conservation of biogeochemical 
cycles is a developing theme among 
international conservation groups. Species 
conservation has been replaced by habitat 
conservation which is now being replaced by 
ecological process conservation as a philosophy 
(see, for example, International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
1984). Sustainable development is a concept in 
common currency for third world development 
theorists (Redclift 1987). And though the 
increase in environmental awareness and 
institution building during the seventies and 
eighties has seen the incorporation of 
environmental criteria as part of the reallocation 
process, concerns of this nature tend to be very 
much addenda to the main decision variables. 
Many students of resource management are 
aware that resource allocation decisions should 
capture environmental and social concerns. But, 
in fact, we have a long way to go to ensure the 
law and its administrators oversee protection of 
such interests. 
 
The reasons for the exclusion of these 
interests in reallocations of water (i.e., the 
inability of the “public’ to know or articulate 
their interests, the lack of knowledge about 
hydrologic and ecologic systems, the lack of 
data about the same, the difficulty for public 
groups to defend the claims they do identify) and 
the tension that belies the government’s dual role 
as facilitator of economic expansion and 
protector of “third party” interests, are not likely 
to evaporate in the near future. Forces of inertia 
are deeply intrenched in socio-economic and 
political structures. We can turn the tyranny of 
small decisions and the tyranny of non-decision 
into an open discussion only by the slow and 
painful process of critical evaluation and interest 
articulation. Transaction costs should be high; 
we should be very cautious about what we trade 
away for urban growth and its beneficiaries. 
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